Turley v. Turley : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Turley v. Turley : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rosemond G. Blakelock; Blakelock & Stringer; Attorneys for Appellee.
Don R. Peterson; Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Turley v. Turley, No. 970020 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/620
UTAH B m E P 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS -A 10 
DOCKET NO. 




ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 970020-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOWARD H. MAETANI 
DON R. PETERSEN and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84606 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK, for: 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, Utah 84606 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
FIL 
JUL 2 1 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 




ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case NO. 970020-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOWARD H. MAETANI 
DON R. PETERSEN and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84606 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK, for: 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, Utah 84606 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
ARGUMENT 3 
POINT I 
THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT MANDATE THAT CHILD 
SUPPORT BE FOREVER BASED ON HISTORICAL INCOME. . . 3 
POINT II 
THE "CONSTRUE AGAINST THE DRAFTER" RULE OF 
CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT APPLY 6 
CONCLUSION 8 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited; 
50 West Broadway Assoc's. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
Citv. 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989) 3 
Bettinaer v. Bettinaer. 793 P.2d 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 2,3 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bvbee. 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 
(1957) 7 
Hill v. Hill. 841 P. 2d 722 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 2 
Park Citv Utah Corp. v. Ensian Co.. 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978) . 2 
Regional Sales Agency Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) 2, 3 
Stevensen v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996) 2 
W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake Citv. 802 P.2d 755 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) 4 
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 3, 7 
Wilburn v. Interstate Electric. 748 P.2d 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
6 
Williams v. Miller. 794 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 3 
Statutes and Rules Cited: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1996) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7) (b) (1996) 4 
Other Authorities Cited: 
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 559 (1960) 7 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JULIETTE TURLEY, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 970020-CA 
vs. : Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In her statement of issues presented, Mrs. Turley argues that 
a deferential standard of review applies.1 Mrs. Turley states: 
"The Appellant's argument that a lessor [sic] standard applies, is 
undercut by the continued reference to the Findings of Fact made by 
the Trial Court.11 (Brief of Appellee at 3.) This betrays an 
misunderstanding of the nature of the trial court's decision and 
the scope of this appeal. Mr. Turley's brief does refer to the 
findings of the divorce decree, but this appeal does not, and could 
not, challenge those findings nor any part of the initial decree. 
*Mrs. Turley also includes the statement that "this Court will 
not review issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." 
(Brief of Appellee at 2.) The statement correctly states the law, 
but it is not applicable to this case. Nowhere in her brief does 
Mrs. Turley identify any issue which was raised for the first time 
on appeal, and there are no such new issues. 
At issue here is a post-decree proceeding. The case was decided on 
summary judgment, and the trial court therefore did not and could 
not make any "findings." 
Although an appellate court typically "reviews a trial court's 
modification determination for an abuse of discretion," Hill v. 
Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the trial court's 
determination in this case involves solely an interpretation of the 
wording of the decree of divorce. The trial court treated the 
issue as having been presented by a motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 158.) The only issues presented involve the interpretation of 
the decree. "Since appellate courts are in as good a position as 
trial courts to interpret court rulings . . . , [this court] should 
review the trial court's interpretation of its order for correct-
ness." Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996). 
This rule applies in divorce matters. In Bettinaer v. 
Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), which was an 
appeal from a post-divorce order interpreting the divorce decree, 
this Court stated: 
A judgment must be enforced as written if 
the language is clear and unambiguous. Park 
City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 
450 (Utah 1978). However, ambiguous judgments 
are subject to the same rules of construction 
that apply to all written instruments and "the 
entire record may be resorted to for the 
purpose of construing the judgment." Id. The 
determination of whether a contract is ambig-
uous is, at the outset, a question of law. 
Regional Sales Agency Inc. v. Reichert, 784 
P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "If a 
trial court finds the agreement unambiguous 
and interprets its meaning by examining only 
the words of the agreement, this interpreta-
tion also presents a question of law." Id. 
Therefore, we are not required to give the 
trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous 
judgment any particular weight, but review its 
interpretation under a correctness standard. 
Id. However, if the trial court determines the 
language is ambiguous and finds facts based 
upon extrinsic evidence, appellate review of 
such findings is limited to determining 
whether they are based on substantial, 
competent, admissible evidence. 50 West 
Broadway Assoc's. v. Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171-72 (Utah 
1989). 
793 P. 2d at 391-92. Accord Williams v. Miller, 794 P. 2d 23, 25 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57, 60 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Mrs. Turley cites many cases in support of her claim that a 
deferential standard of review applies, but none is an appeal from 
a trial court's interpretation of its own decree. Because the 
instant appeal challenges the trial court's legal conclusions 
reached on summary judgment, review is for correctness, with no 
deference to the decision below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT MANDATE 
THAT CHILD SUPPORT BE FOREVER BASED 
ON HISTORICAL INCOME. 
The divorce decree states that support will continue lfonly so 
long as the defendant's income is based upon historical earnings of 
$181,000.00 per year." Based on this language, Mrs. Turley argues 
that "[t]he plain use of the language, when interpreted in light of 
3 
the applicable support statutes, is to include the event where Mr. 
Turley might actually terminate his employment, but his historical 
ability to earn will continue as the basis for his support 
obligations." (Brief of Appellee at 8.) Mrs. Turley does not 
identify what are "the applicable support statutes," but one such 
statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1996). That statute 
provides that potential income, derived from work history and other 
factors, should be considered in imputing income for child support 
calculations. Apparently Mrs. Turley stretches this statute in 
light of the decree to conclude that child support will be forever 
fixed based on Mr. Turley's historical income of $181,000.00 per 
year. There are numerous fallacies with this logic. 
First, the language of the decree does not support Mrs. 
Turley's interpretation. The decree should be interpreted to give 
effect to each word. W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City, 802 P.2d 755, 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If interpreted 
as advocated by Mrs. Turley, there would be no purpose for the 
phrase that support should continue "only so long" as income 
remained at historical levels. Under Mrs. Turley's interpretation, 
there would never be a time at which historical income changed. 
A second fallacy in Mrs. Turley's argument is the assumption 
that "the applicable support statutes" mandate that income be 
imputed at historical levels. Utah Code Ann. § 78-4 5-7.5 (1996) 
states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed 
to the parent under Subsection (7). 
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(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a 
parent unless the parent stipulates to the 
amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a 
parent, the income shall be based upon employ-
ment potential and probable earnings as 
derived from work history, occupation qualifi-
cations, and prevailing earnings for persons 
of similar backgrounds in the community. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Income is not imputed, therefore, until after the court finds, 
following a hearing, that the obligor is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. Even then, historical income is only one of several 
factors which the court is to consider in imputing income. 
A third fallacy with Mrs. Turley's interpretation of the 
decree is that the subject provision is not dealing with imputed 
income. The provision states that support will continue so long as 
the income remained at historical levels; it does not say that 
income will be imputed at historical levels and therefore support 
will forever continue at the same level. 
Finally, there is no support for the wild claim that M[a]ny 
other interpretation would open the flood gates for obligor parents 
to avoid high paying and historical income sources, to intention-
ally punish and deprive spouses and children." (Brief of Appellee 
at 9.) The statutory provision quoted above provides a very 
adequate hedge against such a possibility. 
The trial court in this case did not purport to impute income 
to Mr. Turley. That issue will likely surface on remand, and the 
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trial court will then be required to hold a hearing, receive 
evidence, and then determine (a) whether to impute income (i.e., is 
Mr. Turley voluntarily unemployed or underemployed) and, if so, (b) 
how much income to impute. Historical earnings is only one of 
several factors relevant to that decision. The decree does not 
purport to circumvent this process, and Mrs. Turley's argument to 
the contrary should be rejected. 
POINT II 
THE "CONSTRUE AGAINST THE DRAFTER" 
RULE OF CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT APPLY. 
Without citation to supporting authority, Mrs. Turley asserts 
that "it is black letter law" that any ambiguities in the decree 
should be construed against Mr. Turley as the drafter of the 
decree. Initially, it should be noted that there is no evidence in 
the record that Mr. Turley was the sole drafter of the decree. 
More importantly, the rule would not apply even if Mr. Turley were 
the drafter. The comments of this Court in Wilburn v. Interstate 
Electric, 748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), are apropos: 
Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine that 
contracts should be construed against the 
drafter. The doctrine does not operate in 
dispositive fashion simply because ambiguity 
has been found. Once a contract is deemed 
ambiguous, the next order of business is to 
admit extrinsic evidence to aid in interpre-
tation of the contract. It is only after 
extrinsic evidence is considered and the court 
is still uncertain as to the intention of the 
parties that ambiguities should be construed 
against the drafter. In other words, the 
doctrine of construing ambiguities in a con-
tract against the drafter functions as a kind 
of tie-breaker, used as a last resort by the 
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fact-finder after the receipt and considera-
tion of all pertinent extrinsic evidence has 
left unresolved what the parties actually 
intended. This rule has been summarized as 
follows: 
After applying all of the ordinary pro-
cesses of interpretation, including all 
existing usages, general, local, 
technical, trade, and the custom and 
agreement of the two parties with each 
other, having admitted in evidence and 
duly weighed all the relevant circum-
stances and communications between the 
parties, there may still be doubt as to 
the meaning that should be given and made 
effective by the court. If . . . the 
remaining doubt as to the proper inter-
pretation is merely as to which of two 
possible and reasonable meanings should 
be adopted, the court will adopt that one 
which is less favorable in its legal 
effect to the party who chose the words. 
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 559 (1960). 
748 P.2d at 585-86 (footnotes omitted). This is consistent with 
the rule that the interpretation of an instrument should be 
determined first from the four corners of instrument, then from 
contemporary writings, then through application of rules of 
construction, and finally from parol extrinsic evidence. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bvbee. 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773, 
775 (1957). 
If the decree in this case were ambiguous, the remedy would 
not be to construe it against the drafter, but rather to resolve 
the ambiguity by reference to other contemporanous writings. The 
most reliable extrinsic evidence would be the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Such an approach was employed in Whitehouse v. 
Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Faced in that 
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case with a "very unusual and perhaps even inequitable division in 
the equity of the family home," the court looked at the decree and 
the supporting findings and conclusions to determine the meaning of 
the decree. 
Paragraph 7 of the Findings in the instant case resolves any 
ambiguity which may exist in the Decree. The findings state that 
it is reasonable for support to continue at the decree level "in 
the event [Mr. Turley7s] income does not terminate." The obvious 
corollary is that the support was not intended to continue at the 
same level if Mr. Turley was unable to find income at the histori-
cal level. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should review the interpretation of the divorce 
decree for correctness, without deference to the decision below. 
The correct interpretation, consistent with the findings of fact, 
is that the decree contemplated that levels of support in the 
decree would continue only if Mr. Turley were able to obtain income 
at the historical level of income. Mr. Turley's petition for 
modification alleges he was not able to maintain that level of 
income. The trial court's judgment of dismissal should be reversed 
and the case remanded for trial on Mr. Turley's petition. 
DATED this 2~/^ day of July, 1997. 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN< 
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